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1. Introduction 
A recent upsurge of empirical studies on the causes of conflict attempts to 
connect various features of the distribution of the relevant characteristic 
(typically ethnicity or religion) to conflict. The distributional indices differ  
(polarization, fractionalization or Lorenz-domination) and so do the various 
specifications of “conflict” (onset, incidence or intensity). Overall, the results are 
far from clear, and combined with the mixture of alternative indices and notions 
of “conflict” it is not surprising that the reader may come away thoroughly 
perplexed. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to 
distinguish between the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies 
the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases. Our analysis 
brings together strands from three of our previous contributions: on polarization 
(Esteban and Ray, 1994, and Duclos, Esteban and Ray, 2004), on conflict and 
distribution (Esteban and Ray, 1999) and on the viability of political systems 
(Esteban and Ray, 2001). 
Interest in the connections between inequality and conflict is not new, of course.  
Political scientists have been much concerned with these issues; see, for 
instance, the prominent contributions by Brockett (1992), Midlarski (1988), 
Muller and Seligson (1987), and Muller, Seligson and Fu (1989). Midlarski 
(1988) and Muller, Seligson and Fu (1989) had already voiced their reservations 
with respect to the standard notions of inequality as an appropriate tool for 
conflict analysis. To go even further back, Nagel (1974) had argued that the 
relationship between inequality and conflict should be non-linear. Indeed, as 
Lichbach’s (1989) survey concludes, the empirical studies on the relationship 
between inequality and conflict-and these typically posit a linear relationship--
have only come up with ambiguous results. 
In the area of economics, the analysis of the link between distribution and 
conflict was largely inspired by a desire to study pathways between inequality 
and growth.1 Certainly the possibility that inequality is a determinant of social 
conflict and --- via this route --- impedes growth is a contender for one of the 
                                                 
1 See Bénabou (1996) for a deep and comprehensive survey. 
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more important pathways. The most recent round of interest in this connection 
was triggered by the contribution of Easterly and Levine (1997) who shifted the 
emphasis to ethnic fractionalization rather than economic inequality, but 
continued to emphasize the “reduced-form” connections with growth. Among 
the more relevant contributions to this literature are the papers by Alesina et al. 
(2003), Collier (1998, 2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), Hegre et al. (2001), La Porta et al. (1999), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005), Reynal-Querol (2002a) and Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2006a).  
But the empirical results are ambiguous, if not controversial. If the pathway 
between fractionalization and growth runs through conflict, it is empirically hard 
to spot. By and large, it is fair to say that most of the literature fails to find any 
significant evidence of ethnic fractionalization as a determinant of conflict. This 
negative finding is underlined by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) who 
obtain, instead, a significant relationship between ethnic polarization and the 
incidence of conflict. (As we shall see below, the two variables are often at odds 
with each other.) While formally not using a measure of polarization, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) also argue that the contested dominance of one large group 
rather than fractionalization increases the probability of civil conflict. The 
Montalvo-Reynal-Querol result has recently been reassessed by Schneider and 
Wiesehomeier (2006a) using a different data set and focusing on onset, rather 
than incidence, of conflict. They argue that fractionalization is a better predictor 
of conflict than polarization.  
Without necessarily taking sides on the empirical merits of these papers, our 
purpose is to provide a simple theoretical framework that might help in ordering 
the various definitions, and in providing some explanations for the seemingly 
confusing evidence. To do this, we follow Esteban and Ray (2001).2 We first 
model the behaviour of players in case of conflict as a game and compute the 
equilibrium payoffs to all players. The status quo against which groups might 
rebel is characterized by a set of political institutions that channel the different 
opposing societal interests and turn them into a collective decision. Examples of 
such institutions are majoritarian or proportional democracies, dictatorships, 
                                                 
2 This line is also adopted in Reynal-Querol (2002b). 
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oligarchies… We abstractly represent these institutions as alternative functions 
mapping the share of the population supporting each interest group into 
collective decisions. We take political institutions as given and hence disregard 
any potential endogeneity.3 Groups will rebel against the ruling political 
institutions whenever the outcome is worse than what they can obtain through 
conflict.  
It is imperative to note that we distinguish between the intensity of conflict, 
conditional on conflict breaking out, and the likelihood that conflict actually 
occurs. The point that we make is very simple. When society is highly polarized, 
there may actually be a wider range of status-quo allocations that groups are 
willing to accept. This is because the potential cost of rebellion is extremely 
high, and this cost of conflict serves as the guarantor of peace. Put another 
way, if conflict is very costly as it will be in highly polarized societies, it is easier 
to find an agreement that is Pareto superior to the conflict regime. At the same 
time, if conflict were to occur for some reason, its intensity would be higher in 
polarized societies. It follows that the intensity of conflict (conditional on its 
occurrence) and the likelihood of conflict may move in opposite directions with 
respect to changing polarization. 
In particular, when the cost of conflict is low, the parties will more easily reject 
proposals that slightly depart from what they can get through conflict. In the 
spirit of the fractionalization vs polarization controversy this argument can be 
summarized as follows. Highly fractionalized societies might be more prone to 
the onset of conflict, but its intensity will be moderate. In highly polarized 
societies, the occurrence of open conflict should be rare but its intensity very 
severe. In this paper we develop this argument and show that: (i) measures of 
fractionalization and polarization tend to run in opposite directions, (ii) the onset 
of conflict critically depends on the political system in place, (iii) the occurrence 
                                                 
3 The point was already made by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that political systems might 
be endogenous, influenced by the particular social structure of the country. Why then 
societies fail to adapt their institutions to the change of the environment so as to always 
prevent domestic conflict? A number of arguments have been put forward by Powell 
(2004) –incomplete information--, Fearon (1995), Powell (2006) and Leventoglu and 
Slantchev (2006) –inability to credibly commit--, and Esteban and Ray (2006c) –empty 
core— to explain the break out of conflict. We shall not pursue this line of enquire here 
and will take the political system as given. 
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of conflict and the intensity of conflict also tend to move in opposite directions, 
(iv) the relationship between polarization or fractionalization and conflict is non-
monotonic and (v) the intensity of conflict depends positively on the degree of 
polarization.4 
Our paper is organized as follows. We start by comparing the indices of 
fractionalization and polarization. Section 3 develops a simple model of conflict 
based on the general class studied in Esteban and Ray (1999). In order to 
present the ideas in the sharpest form, in Section 4 we start our study of the 
occurrence and intensity of conflict focusing on the case of two opposing groups 
only. This case permits a very neat understanding of the causes of intensity of 
conflict and the causes of its occurrence. However, as we shall see, in the case 
of two groups the notions of fractionalization and polarization are 
undistinguishable from each other. In section 5 we generalize the results to the 
case of an arbitrary number of groups and examine the different performance of 
the indices of polarization and fractionalization. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Polarization and Fractionalization 
We begin by defining the indices of fractionalization and polarization. 
The index of fractionalization F is intended to capture the degree to which a 
society is split into distinct groups. The measure has been widely used in 
studies that attempt to link ethnolinguistic diversity to conflict, public goods 
provision, or growth (see, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999). 
Let ni be the share of the population belonging to group i, i = 1,…,G.  The 
fractionalization index is defined as the probability that two randomly chosen 
individuals belong to different groups. The probability that an individual of group 
i is chosen is ni. Hence that probability that if chosen she is matched with 
                                                 
4 This discussion can also shed some light on the controversy on the stabilizing or 
destabilizing effects of “polarity”; a classic the international relations literature. See 
Waltz (1964) and Deutsch and Singer (1964), for instance. 
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someone from another group is ni(1-ni). It follows that the probability that any 
two individuals belong to different groups is  
(1)    
! 
F = n
i
(1" n
i
) =
i
# 1" ni
2
i
# . 
F is a strictly concave function of each population share. From this strict 
concavity we can derive the following properties of F. 
(a) Any transfer of population from a group to a smaller one increases F ; 
(b) For a given number of groups, G, F is maximized at the uniform 
population distribution over these groups; 
(c) Over the set of uniform distributions F increases with the number of 
groups ; and 
(d) The split of any group with population n into two new groups with n’ 
and n”, n’ + n” = n, increases F. 
 
Polarization is conceptualized in Esteban and Ray (1994) as the sum of inter-
personal “antagonisms”. Antagonism results from the interplay of the sense of 
group identification (group size) and the sense of alienation with respect to 
members of other groups (inter-group distance, bij).5  Esteban and Ray’s 
polarization measure6 P can be written as 
(2)    
! 
P(",b) = ni
1+"
n jbij
j# i
$
i
$  , 
                                                 
5 Alternative notions of polarization not based on the identity/alienation framework have 
been proposed by Wang and Tsui (2000), Reynal-Querol (2002c), and Zhang and 
Kanbur (2001). Another alternative and – considerably cruder - specification of 
polarization which also does not include a proxy for intra-group homogeneity in the 
absence of information is the concept of dominance that Collier (2001) introduced. It 
qualifies societies as “dominated” if the largest group contains between 45 and 90% of 
the overall population. 
6 Esteban and Ray (1994) examine the main properties of this measure. The interested 
reader can also see Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) for a measure of polarization for 
continuous distributions. 
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where b is the matrix of inter-group distances and σ is a positive parameter that 
captures the extent of group identification. Esteban and Ray (see also Duclos et 
al (2004)) derive restrictions on σ that bound it both above and below. The 
exact form of these restrictions is not particularly important here, though we 
record for use below that σ must be less than 2.  
A situation of particular relevance is the special case in which individuals in 
each group feel equally alien towards all groups other than their own. That is, bij 
= bi for all j≠i. In this case P reduces to 
(3)   
! 
P(",b) = n
i
1+"
1# n
i( )bi
i
$ . 
Observe that if we set σ = 1 and bi = 1 for all i we obtain the measure of 
polarization introduced by Reynal-Querol (2002c); a special case of (2). This 
specific measure of polarization was later used in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005) to test the relationship between polarization and conflict. 
It is also true that we can formally set σ = 0 in (3), as well as bi = 1 for all i, to 
arrive at the measure of fractionalization (1). We emphasize that this is a formal 
and not a conceptual connection: for (3) to be a measure of polarization it is 
necessary that σ be strictly positive, and—depending on the exact 
characterization—perhaps more than that.7 Nevertheless, it is useful to record 
that 
(4)    P(1,1) = RQ and P(0,1) = F, 
where the entry 1 stands for the matrix of all 1’s.  
In order to simplify the computations, in this paper we shall work with the 
special class of polarization indices, P(1,1), that is 
(5)   
! 
P " P(1,1) = n
i
2
(1# n
i
)
i
$ . 
                                                 
7 For instance, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) argue that s is at least 0.25. 
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In order to examine the properties of P we start by observing that P is the sum 
of the function p(n) = n2(1-n) evaluated at the different ni. But now p(.) is convex 
or concave as n <(>) 1/3. Therefore, we have the following properties for P. 
Properties of P 
(a’) A transfer of population from a group to a smaller one increases P if 
both groups are larger than 1/3. If the two groups are smaller than 1/3 the 
equalization of populations will bring P down; 
(b’) For any given number of groups, P is maximized when the population 
is concentrated on two equally sized groups only; 
(c’) Over the set of uniform distributions P decreases with the number of 
groups, provided that there are at least two groups to begin with; and 
(d’) The split of a group with population n into two groups with n’ and n”, 
n’ + n” = n, increases P if and only if n ≥ 2/3. 
The contrast between the two sets of properties clearly shows that the two 
measures behave quite differently from each other, except when there are just 
two groups. The difference is clear: fractionalization is maximal when each 
individual is different from the rest while polarization is maximal when there are 
only two types of individuals. 
The reader is referred to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for further 
discussion on the difference between these two measures.  
This completes our discussion of the indices. We now turn to a model of conflict 
and peace. 
 
3. A Model of War and Peace 
3.1. Conflict 
We start with conflict as our first building block. In modeling conflict we follow 
Esteban and Ray (1999). We concentrate on a special case studied in that 
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paper: the class of conflict games called contests. Assume that there are G 
alternatives, i = 1,…,G. Individuals differ in the alternative they like the most and 
are indifferent over the other available alternatives. Individuals in a specific 
group i are all alike, in that they like alternative i the best, and the difference in 
valuation between their most preferred alternative and any other is the common 
value bi. Let ni denote the relative size of group i. Note that the alternatives here 
are public goods because their valuation by the individuals is independent of the 
number of beneficiaries. Therefore, we can think of alternatives as different 
kinds of public goods to be financed by the public budget. 
By a political system we shall refer to a particular way of choosing among the 
different alternatives. By conflict we mean a challenge to such a system, which 
is costly. Specifically, we take the following view.  Conflict entails resource 
contributions ri (to be determined presently) from every member of group i, so 
that the overall contribution of group i is niri. In the absence of a political rule, 
the particular alternative that will  eventually come about is seen by the players 
as probabilistic. The probability that alternative i will be established is assumed 
to be equal to the resources niri expended by group relative to the total 
resources R expended. In short, the probability of success pi is just  
(6)    
! 
pi =
niri
n jrj
j
"
#
niri
R
, 
where R  is the sum of all the group contributions. In the sequel, we shall take 
this very R to be a measure of the overall intensity of conflict (or wastage) in the 
society. 
To understand how contributions are determined, suppose that there is a utility 
cost of spending ri; call it c(ri).  Take this function to be of  the constant-elasticity 
form  
(7)    
! 
c(r
i
) =
r
i
1+"
1+"
, with α  > 0. 
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Given the resources expended by the others, r-i, the expected utility of an 
individual of group i when spending ri is 
(8)  
! 
E(ui(ri)) = pibi " c(ri) =
niri
n jrj
j
#
bi "
ri
1+$
1+$
. 
Expected utility is clearly concave in ri and hence the utility maximizing level of 
expenditure can be characterized by the first order condition: 
(9)  
! 
ni
n jrj
j
"
1#
niri
n jrj
j
"
$ 
% 
& 
& 
& 
' 
( 
) 
) 
) 
bi =
ni
R
1# pi( )bi = ri
*
. 
An equilibrium of the conflict game is a vector r such that (9) is satisfied for all 
i=1,…,G.  
There is always an equilibrium of the conflict game. Esteban and Ray (1999) 
demonstrate, furthermore, that if α ≥ 1 then such an equilibrium must be unique. 
In order to simplify the computations we shall focus on the case of symmetric 
valuations, with bi = 1 for all i, and α = 1.  
Multiplying both sides of (9) by 
! 
n
i
R
 we obtain 
(10)    
! 
ni
R
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
2
1( pi( ) = pi , 
And transposing terms, we conclude that 
(11)    
! 
pi =
ni
2
ni
2
+ R
2 . 
The equilibrium value of R has to be such that the sum of the probabilities given 
by (11) adds up to unity, that is  
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(12)     
! 
pi
i
" =
ni
2
ni
2
+ R
2
=1
i
" . 
The LHS of (12) is strictly decreasing in R. Using (10), it is immediate that when 
R goes to zero the LHS tends to G > 1 and that when R tends to infinity the LHS 
tends to zero. Therefore a solution to (12) always exists and it is unique.  
Substituting the equilibrium R into (11) yields the equilibrium probabilities. 
In order to obtain a useful expression for equilibrium payoffs we multiply both 
sides of (9) by 
! 
r
i
2
 to see that  
(13)   
! 
1
2
pi 1" pi( ) =
1
2
ri
2
# c(ri) . 
Using (13) in (8) yields 
(14)    
! 
E(ui(ri)) =
pi(pi +1)
2
. 
For the case of two groups, G = 2, setting n1 = n and p1 = p, the equilibrium 
values are easy to compute:  
(15)     
! 
p = n ,  
(16)    
! 
R = n(1" n) , and  
(17)  
! 
E(u
1
(r
1
)) =
n(n +1)
2
 and  E(u
2
(r
2
)) =
(1" n) 2 " n( )
2
. 
The equilibrium payoffs to conflict for player i will be simply denoted ui. 
 
3.2. Peace 
In the previous subsection we have examined the equilibrium outcome of a 
conflict game under the assumption that conflict actually takes place. Now we 
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are in a position to compare a conflictual situation with that of peace. Under 
peace, individuals must accept the payoff that the ruling political system 
allocates to them. As mentioned before, the political allocation can be 
interpreted as the share of the public budget allocated to the production of the 
type of public good most preferred by each group. We define a policy to be a 
vector γ of shares, with γι denoting the share of group i. Hence, we can interpret 
γ as a “compromise policy” composed of a convex linear combination over the 
available alternative types of public goods.  
Formally, we shall have peace whenever 
(18)   ui ≤ γι for all i = 1,…,G. 
It is trivial but nevertheless useful to observe that whether we have conflict or 
peace critically depends on what the ruling political system delivers to the 
different contending groups. 
A political system is a particular way of mapping the population shares 
supporting each alternative into policies. 
We shall examine here various political systems and check for their ability to 
guarantee peace. Specifically, we shall study dictatorship, fixed shares, 
majoritarian rule and proportional rule. 
Our first example of a political system is a dictatorship. This will be the case 
when the alternative preferred by some group i is brought into effect, 
irrespective of the number of individuals for whom this is the best choice. If 
group i is the dictator, then γi = 1 and γj = 0 for all j ≠ i. 
The second case is fixed shares, which generalizes a dictatorship. The policy 
consists of a vector γ assigning a share to each group independent of its 
population size. There are many instances of such a political system. Various 
political bodies have fixed proportional representations of the different opposing 
interests (often rural vs urban). There are also cases where the chairs of the 
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two chambers have to alternate between the different ethnic or religious groups 
in the country.8  
The majoritarian rule generates the policies that earn the support of a majority 
of citizens. For the case of G = 2 this is very easy to define: γι = 1 if and only if ni 
> 1/2.9 For G > 2 the characterization of the policies resulting from a 
majoritarian rule is more intricate as it involves the formation of a majoritarian 
coalition. In some special environments there is a well-defined pivotal group 
(the median voter) who can impose its preferred policy to the rest of the 
majoritarian coalition. This is not the case here and hence most of what we can 
say will be restricted to the two-group case. 
Finally, the proportional rule produces the policy that assigns to each group a 
share equal to its population size: γi = ni. Parliamentary representations satisfy 
this rule for most countries (not in the UK where each seat corresponds to one 
constituency). Although most decisions simply require a majority vote in the 
chamber, the resulting policies tend to give some weight to the minoritarian 
opposition. Multi-level government also contributes to give to the different 
groups an overall weight that brings them closer to their population share. 
In the next section we study the relationship between polarization, 
fractionalization and conflict under the different political systems for the case of 
two groups. In section 5 we generalize to G groups. 
 
4. Polarization, fractionalization, conflict and the political system (G=2) 
                                                 
8 This was the first constitutional arrangement for the Lebanon after independence. The 
constitution established that the president had to be a Christian. The faster population 
growth rate among the Muslim population made this provision untenable and possibly 
contributed to the outbreak of the civil war. Another example is the EU “rotating 
presidency” across the member countries with a frequency that is independent of their 
population. 
9 This is a extremely stylized representation of the majoritarian rule. Real world 
majoritarian democracies do not work like this. A number of written and/or unwritten 
rules protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. This observation has led 
Lijphart (1977) to launch the concept of “consociational” policies that end up producing 
an outcome that approaches the proportionality rule. Lijphart has been a steady 
supporter of “consociational” constitutions for countries with deep ethnic cleavages. 
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We are interested here in two quite different aspects of conflict. In the first 
place, we want to characterize the relationship between the intensity conflict 
and polarization when conflict actually takes place. This relationship is 
independent of the political system. Secondly, we wish to identify the 
relationship between polarization and the occurrence of conflict (or peace!). 
 
 Intensity of conflict 
We start by noting that for G = 2 the measures F and P (and hence RQ) are 
proportional to each other. Furthermore, they all attain their maximum at n = 
1/2. It follows that any comparative test of the performance of P (or RQ) relative 
to F as a predictor of conflict should focus on cases with G ≥ 3. We discuss this 
case in the next section. 
In view of (16), the level of conflict R is the square root of P and hence conflict 
intensity is an increasing function of polarization and of fractionalization.10 
 
Figure 1 
                                                 
10 If we drop now the restriction that a = 1 but retain that b = 1, P(a,1) ceases to be 
proportional to F, but continues to behave like it. Indeed, P(a,1) is concave and attains 
its maximum at n = 1/2. Therefore, we will still have that increases in P(a,1) go with 
increases in the level of conflict R. Things are different when we allow for asymmetric 
inter-group distances. It can be readily verified that if b < 1 (>) both polarization and 
conflict are maximized at (two different) values nP,nR > 1/2 (<). Therefore, except for 
values of n within this interval, the level of conflict will be strictly increasing with 
polarization. The non-monotonicity with respect to F and RQ will be for n in the interval 
(1/2,nR). 
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In Figure 1 we plot the intensity of conflict as a function of the population shares 
n (left figure) and of the corresponding level of polarization P (right figure). 
Intensity is maximal for n = ½, that is when polarization is also maximal with P = 
1/4. 
Figure 2 
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It will also be useful to record the equilibrium utility payoffs as given by (17) and 
which we represent in Figure 2. These payoffs depend on the population 
distribution parameter n. The equilibrium utility for each player is the win 
probability p = n minus the cost of the resources expended in conflict, equal for 
both types of players for G = 2. The win probabilities are points on the straight 
line between (0,1) and (1,0), the utility possibility frontier. Given n, from the 
corresponding point on the frontier we move inwards along a 45º line for a 
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length equivalent to the utility loss caused by the spent resources. This gives us 
a utility equilibrium pair. As we vary n we generate all the points of the 
equilibrium payoff curve. The maximum distance between the payoff curve and 
the frontier is at n = ½ where the conflict loss is maximal. 
So much for intensity. Let us now turn to the occurrence of conflict. This 
depends on the payoffs obtained in peace and these in turn depend on the 
political system. 
 
 Dictatorship 
The first political system we examine is dictatorship. Will there ever be peace? 
The answer is no. The reason is simple. In equilibrium conflict, all players 
receive a strictly positive payoff because they could have opted for contributing 
nothing to conflict, thus guaranteeing for themselves a payoff of zero. Hence, 
for a non-dictator obtaining a peace payoff of zero is always dominated by the 
conflict payoff. 
 
 Fixed shares 
We next examine the case of fixed shares γ.  
The necessary and sufficient condition for conflict is that either 
(19)   
! 
n(1+ n)
2
> "  or  
(1# n)(2 # n)
2
>1# " . 
 
Figure 3 
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The situation is captured in Figure 3. Consider the peace share γ and the 
corresponding utility payoff. For a population parameter like n’ the payoffs to 
conflict are dominated by the peace payoff for the two players. However, if we 
decrease sufficiently the population share of the first group—all the way down to 
n”, the second group would have a strong advantage over the first in conflict 
and thus prefers conflict to the peace payoff. 
To be more specific, let us rewrite the inequalities in (19) as 
(20)   
! 
n "
n(1" n)
2
> #  or  n +
n(1" n)
2
< # . 
The LHS of the two inequalities is strictly increasing in n (one convex and the 
other concave). Therefore, there exist n’ and n” such that if 
! 
n " [n',n"] there 
is peace and conflict otherwise.  
In Figure 4 we depict the values of n for which, given γ, we shall have peace. 
These are the values of n corresponding to the points on the equilibrium utility 
curve at which one of the two players is indifferent with respect to the peace 
payoff. 
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Figure 4 
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Clearly, the interval of values of n for which there will be peace depends on the 
bias exhibited by the fixed-shares policy γ. Let us take as a benchmark the case 
of equal treatment of the two groups of players with γ = ½. From our previous 
analysis it follows that for very low polarization (i.e. for very low or very large n) 
there will be conflict, but its level will be low. As polarization increases the level 
of conflict will increase too. But, further increases in polarization will produce 
peace and bring the level of conflict down to zero. The overall relationship 
between polarization or fractionalization and conflict is therefore non-monotonic. 
We can address the complementary question of the range of policies γ that 
would guarantee peace for given n. This range is given by the gap between the 
two bounds: n(1-n). Hence the widest range for peaceful policies corresponds to 
n = 1/2. High polarization allows for a wider choice of peaceful fixed-share 
policies. The intuition for this result is straightforward. If there is conflict, higher 
polarization produces larger losses. Hence, it is only when the policy is very 
biased against one group that that group will decide to incur the heavy cost of 
conflict. With low polarization the costs are smaller and hence a lower bias in γ 
might be enough to trigger conflict. 
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 Majority rule 
The case of majority rule is equivalent to letting the largest group become a 
dictator. By the same argument as before, we shall never have peace as the 
minoritarian group will always obtain a higher payoff under conflict than under 
peace. Hence, with majority rule we shall always have conflict11 and the level of 
conflict will positively depend on the degree of polarization. 
 
 Proportional rule 
We start by noting that in the previous case of fix shares, in view of (20), when γ 
is sufficiently close to the win probability of that group peace will not be 
challenged. Under our assumptions, p = n and hence making γ = n would 
guarantee peace. This precisely is the proportional rule that gives each group a 
share equal to its population size, that is, γi = ni. 
Therefore, for symmetric valuations we should never observe conflict under the 
proportionality rule.12 
The intuition for this result is that the proportionality rule gives to each group a 
weight that is close to their win probability under conflict. Hence, it never pays to 
challenge the peace allocation.13 As we will see, this result is specific to the two-
group case and does not extend to the case of a larger number of groups. 
                                                 
11 Let us insist in that this statement is not meant to be empirically relevant as none of 
the existing majoritarian democracies permits the tyranny of the majority. From an 
empirical point of view the practical distinction between majoritarian and proportional 
democracies is far from clear. The use of the notion of “inclusiveness” of a political 
system as in Reynal-Querol (2005) might be more relevant. 
12 This is no longer true for asymmetric valuations. The equilibrium p can be made 
arbitrarily close to unity by choosing b for one group sufficiently close to zero. 
13 This result seems to substantiate Lijphart’s view that “consociational” systems, 
because they are essentially proportional, permit peaceful arrangement in ethnically 
divided societies. [see more in footnote 13] 
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Diagrammatically, we can see in Figure 2 that the point (n,1-n) always 
dominates the conflict equilibrium payoffs. 
 
 Summing up 
In this section we have obtained two main results. The first one is that it does 
matter for conflict which political system is in place. Dictatorships and 
majoritarian systems never yield peace. Fixed shares may give peaceful 
outcomes for some parameter values. The proportional system always yields 
peace, at least whenever there are just two groups.  
The second result is that while the intensity of conflict is positively related to the 
degree of polarization, the incidence of conflict is not. Only in the fixed shares 
system does the incidence of conflict depend on the distribution of the 
population across the two groups. For the other three political systems the 
incidence of conflict is independent of the distribution (and hence of the degree 
of polarization). For the fixed shares system conflict is more likely at low levels 
of polarization and peace more likely at high levels. Therefore, if there is any 
relation between conflict and polarization this is non-monotonic. 
Our analysis also suggests that if one wishes to test for the occurrence of 
conflict, the political system appears to be a key variable, along with the degree 
of social polarization (or fractionalization). 
 
5. Polarization, conflict and political rules with several groups 
 We shall examine now whether our previous conclusions can be extended to 
the general case of several groups.  
 
 Intensity of conflict 
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We start with the relationship between polarization and the intensity of conflict, 
R. The relationship between the intensity of conflict and polarization has been 
extensively studied in Esteban and Ray (1999, section 6). Using Esteban and 
Ray (1999, expression 16) we can write 
(21)    
! 
R =
ni
pii
" ni
2
(1# ni)bi . 
Comparing (21) with the measure of polarization P in (4) we can observe that, if 
pi = ni , the level of conflict R would be equal to the index of polarization P(1,b).  
The n/p ratio is determined in equilibrium and will generally be different from 
unity. Therefore, how closely related P is to R critically depends on how much 
n/p varies across the different groups in equilibrium. It can be shown that the 
case in which ni/pi = 1 for all i is specific to the symmetric case for G = 2 or for 
uniform distributions over G > 2 groups. Therefore, on these grounds alone, we 
should a priori expect a positive but incomplete association between 
polarization P(1,b) [and hence P(1,1)=RQ] and the level of conflict R. However, 
the discussion that now follows suggests that there are pretty tight connections 
between the two. 
Drawing on the results in Esteban and Ray (1999) we can restate the following 
properties of R, implicitly determined in (12), to be contrasted with the 
properties of F and P presented in section 2.  
(i) A transfer of population from a group to a smaller one increases R if 
both groups are larger than 1/3. If the two groups are small enough the 
equalization of populations will bring R down; 
(ii) For any given G, R is maximized when the population is concentrated 
on two equally sized groups only; 
(iii) Over the set of uniform distributions R decreases with the number of 
groups G; and 
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(iv) The split of a group with population n into two groups with n’ and n”, 
n’ + n” = n, increases R if and only if the group size is sufficiently large. If n is 
small, the split will decrease R. 
Do the properties of our theoretical model align with our intuition on the intensity 
of conflict? Consider conflict among three groups of varying size. Property (i) 
says that equalizing the size of the two largest groups will increase conflict while 
reducing the size of the second largest group at the benefit of the smallest will 
reduce conflict. Property (ii) appears to conform to the common intuition that 
conflict is worst when society is split into two equally sized groups. In the case 
considered by Property (iii) each group becomes progressively smaller, while its 
collective opponent (the rest of the groups) becomes larger. In this case the 
smaller groups will commit less resources into conflict. As for Property (iv), 
consider first the case of a monolithic society that gets split into two distinct 
groups. This must increase the intensity of conflict. The same has to be true 
even if the initial society was not monolithic, but had a small “dissident” group. 
But suppose now that after the first split the second sized group splits into two 
smaller groups. Then we would expect that conflict would come down because 
now the untouched group has become relatively larger than the others. The 
smaller groups may not be willing to contribute a lot of resources to conflict.  
In sum, the properties displayed by our conflict model do not seem to contradict 
our intuitions about conflict intensity. 
Let us now compare the properties of R and P. It is immediate that the two sets 
of properties describe movements in the same direction for the type of 
population changes considered. Hence, we should expect a strong positive 
relation between polarization and conflict intensity. [See a parametric illustration 
below] 
How does the index of fractionalization F behave relative to R? Property (i) of R  
is not satisfied by F. Property (a) of F says that any equalization of sizes will 
increase F. In contrast, R may go either up or down depending on the size of 
the groups involved. Properties (ii) and (b) are aligned as long as there are two 
groups in conflict to start with. With more groups F is maximized at the uniform 
 23 
distribution while R continues to be maximal when the population is 
concentrated on two equally sized groups. Properties (iii) and (c) are exactly the 
opposite of each other. Finally, when we compare Properties (iv) and (d) we 
observe that any split always increases F, while R may either decrease or 
increase depending on the size of the broken group. 
We can thus conclude that we can expect a strong positive relationship 
between polarization and conflict, and a weak and (if anything) negative 
relationship between fractionalization and conflict, at least insofar as intensity is 
concerned. 
We now turn to an analysis of the incidence of conflict when there are more 
than two groups. 
 
 Dictatorship and majoritarian rule 
Notice our arguments on the impossibility of peace under dictatorship or the 
majoritarian rule did not depend on the number of groups. In both cases, the 
excluded groups will obtain a lower payoff than what they can obtain under 
conflict. 
 
 Fixed shares 
From (14) we have that there will be conflict whenever 
(22)   
! 
pi(1+ pi)
2
> " i  for some i = 1,…,G. 
Using (11) in (22) we obtain that the condition for conflict is 
(23)   
! 
u
i
=
1
2
n
i
2
n
i
2
+ R
2
1+
n
i
2
n
i
2
+ R
2
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' > ( i . 
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Consider any given vector of shares γ  and a particular group of size ni. Observe 
that the payoff ui can take values in (0,1) depending on R. Therefore, the 
condition for conflict is most likely to be satisfied when R is small and hence 
polarization is small too. To be precise, suppose that all the remaining groups 
have the same size, 
! 
n j =
1" ni
G "1
, j # i. It can be readily verified from (12) that R 
is strictly decreasing in G. It follows that there is a G sufficiently large so that a 
uniform distribution over the G-1 remaining groups would induce group i to 
prefer conflict. Note that as G becomes large polarization comes down and 
fractionalization goes up. Therefore we shall see conflict with low levels of 
polarization and high levels of fractionalization, but the intensity of conflict will 
be low. 
In the discussion above, observe that it is the untouched group, the group which 
has become larger relative to the others, is the one who prefers conflict to 
peace. Hence, even in this case, one might argue that it is not high 
fractionalization as such that precipitates conflict but the coexistence of one 
large group with numerous small groups. In fact, if we now equalize the size of 
all the groups, thus increasing F and decreasing P, no group would have an 
incentive to challenge the peace share and we would have peace with higher 
fractionalization. 
To sum up, for the egalitarian fixed shares policy, conflict will not occur in 
economies with high polarization/low fractionalization. For distributions 
displaying low polarization/high fractionalization, the relation between conflict 
and F or P will be non-linear. Conflict will be most likely for distributions with one 
large group and many small ones (and hence with relatively high 
fractionalization and low polarization).  
As the rule of fixed shares departs from egalitarianism, the occurrence of 
conflict will critically depend upon the bias introduced by the rule. 
 
 Proportional rule 
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Once again, from (14) we have that under the proportional rule there will be 
conflict whenever 
(24)   
! 
pi +1
2
>
ni
pi
 for some i = 1,…,G. 
In the previous section we have seen that for G = 2 the proportional rule always 
guarantees peace. Does this property extend to G > 2?  
A first observation is that for the distributions under which the equilibrium win 
probabilities are very close to the population shares condition (24) will not be 
satisfied and we shall observe peace. We shall only have conflict when pi is 
sufficiently larger than ni for some group i. 
Using (10) in (14), we can rewrite condition (24) as  
(25)   
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The LHS of (25) can take values in (0,
! 
1
2n
i
), depending on R. Provided 2ni < 1 , 
we have already seen that there is a distribution of the population (for G 
sufficiently large) so that group i will prefer conflict over peace. Esteban and 
Ray (2001) demonstrate that under these assumptions there always are 
distributions for which (25) is satisfied for one group. Here are two numerical 
examples: G=5 with one group being 1/3 of the population and the other four of 
size 1/6; and G=4 with one group of size 1/2 and the other three of size 1/6.14 
As in the case of fixed coefficients conflict occurs in very skewed distributions 
by size. One large group together with a number of small sized groups is the 
type of distribution that would be more likely to generate open conflict. Because 
                                                 
14 The case of India has been taken as a critical test for Lijphart’s claim that 
“consociational” systems –hence proportional—are guarantors of ethnic peace. Most of 
the debate, Lijphart (1996) and Wilkinson (2000), has focused on whether India was 
more “consociational” under Nerhu or more recently. Our analysis suggests that the 
change in population sizes of Hindus, Muslims and others that has actually taken place 
in India in 1961-2001 might also have a role in explaining the evolution of ethnic 
conflict. 
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of the returns to scale in conflict, the win probability of the large group may 
amply exceed its population share. Furthermore, precisely because of the 
returns to scale the small groups will be deterred from expending much 
resources in such an uneven conflict and hence we shall observe a low conflict 
loss R. High win probabilities together with small aggregate losses make conflict 
preferable to peace as far as the large group is concerned.  
Therefore, we may conclude that with G > 2 under the proportional rule we may 
have conflict. This will be associated with distributions with low polarization and 
high fractionalization. However, the relationship will be non-monotonic: 
additional increases in fractionalization may bring peace rather than further 
conflict. 
In order to illustrate this relationship consider the following parametric example. 
There are three groups with n1 = ½, n2 = λ ½, and n3 = (1-λ) ½, 0 ≤ λ ≤ ½. When 
λ = 0 we have two groups with the same population and thus maximal 
polarization. When λ = ½ we shall have the same first group facing two groups 
of half the size. F and P can be computed to be 
(26)    
! 
F(") =
1+ " # "2
2
, and 
(27)    
! 
P(") =
3# " + "2
8
=
1
2
#
F
4
. 
From (27) it is plain that when λ changes fractionalization and polarization move 
in opposite directions: as we move away from the perfect bipolar distribution P 
comes down but F goes up. 
Using this parametrization for the distribution of the population in expression 
(12) we implicitly obtain the equilibrium intensity of conflict R as a function of λ. 
Totally differentiating, we obtain that R decreases as λ increases, i.e. as P 
decreases and as F increases. Conflict intensity goes from R(0) = 0.5 to R(1/2) 
= 0.211. This is depicted in Figure 5. 
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Whether there will be conflict or peace under the proportional rule depends on 
whether the untouched group –always with population ½-- obtains a conflict 
equilibrium utility higher or lower than ½. In Figure 5 we also depict u1 as a 
function of λ. Not surprisingly, as λ increases group 1 is facing smaller and 
smaller enemies. Hence, u1 increases with λ. The large group obtains a higher 
utility from conflict the less polarized the distribution is. The equilibrium utility 
goes from u1(0) = 0.375  to u1(1/2) = 0.837. It follows that for low λ the 
equilibrium utility of group 1 will be below the peace payoff and there will be 
peace. This corresponds to the highest levels of polarization and lowest of 
fractionalization. For λ > λº [see Figure 5] there will be conflict. Therefore, open 
conflict will be associated with low polarization and high fractionalization. 
Figure 5 
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We finally combine the intensity with the occurrence of conflict and derive the 
relationship between observable intensity of conflict and both fractionalization 
and polarization. This is depicted in Figure 6. As we can see, in both cases the 
relation is nonmonotonic. For the case of fractionalization, there is peace until 
the threshold level Fº is reached. At this point, there is conflict and it attains its 
maximum intensity. For higher values of F we continue to have conflict but its 
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intensity monotonically comes down. The relationship between P and 
observable intensity of conflict is the other side of the coin. Open conflict occurs 
at low levels of polarization. As polarization goes up the intensity of conflict 
raises until the threshold Pº is attained. For higher levels of polarization the 
costs of conflict are so high that we will observe peace. The two functions are 
depicted in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 
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 Summing up 
When we consider distributions with more than two groups it is still true that the 
occurrence of conflict critically depends on the particular political system in 
place. Dictatorship and the majoritarian rule can never bring peace, as we 
already observed for G = 2. But in general, both fixed shares and proportional 
rule fail to universally guarantee peaceful outcomes. We shall not see conflict 
neither for very low nor for very high levels of fractionalization15 and a similar 
(but inverse) pattern would be followed by polarization. 
                                                 
15 This seems to contradict the result obtained by our parametric example above. This 
is due to the very special change in the distribution that our parametrization allows for. 
Consider for instance our limit case with l = ½ (n1 = ½, n2 = ¼, n3 = ¼).  
Fractionalization is maximal and we still have conflict. However, if we now move to n1 = 
n2 = n3 = 1/3—not allowed by our parametrization—fractionalization would be even 
higher but there would be no conflict. 
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Concerning the general relationship between polarization, fractionalization and 
conflict our results suggest that they will be significantly nonlinear. Under some 
political systems the occurrence of conflict is independent of the shape of the 
distribution while in other systems it does depend on the shape. Under the first 
class of political systems the intensity of conflict will be closely (positively) 
related to the degree of polarization (and negatively to fractionalization). Under 
the second class (fixed and proportional shares) we shall observe zero intensity 
at high and very low levels of polarization (and fractionalization). For the range 
of levels of polarization for which we shall have conflict, higher polarization will 
be positively related to higher intensity of conflict. As far as fractionalization is 
concerned there seems to be no regular relationship between its level and the 
intensity of conflict. 
All these results suggest that there may be more to be learned from empirical 
exercises that put all the evidence together and also attempt to control for the 
political system of each country.16 
 
6. Conclusions 
We provide an analytical framework that permits an interpretation of recent 
empirical exercises attempting to identify a meaningful relationship between 
population distributions over opposing groups and emergence or intensity of 
conflict. Conflict breaks out when the payoffs delivered by the political system 
fall short of what one group can obtain by precipitating conflict. While the 
intensity of conflict clearly depends on the shape of the distribution, the 
occurrence of conflict also depends on the responsiveness of each political 
system to the popular support for each of the competing alternatives. When we 
                                                 
16 Political scientists have been aware for long of the critical role played by the political 
institutions in preventing domestic conflict. The work of Lijphart (1977) is fundamental 
here. See also the recent controversy between Horowitz (2006) and Fraenkel and 
Grofman (2006) on the effectiveness of constitutional engineering. Our point is that in 
spite of this important line of literature, empirical tests on the determinants of conflict 
have very seldom controlled for the political system. An exception is the work by 
Reynal-Querol (2002b, 2005) and by Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2006b) who do 
study the relationship between political systems and domestic conflict.   
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combine occurrence with intensity, the relationship between conflict and 
polarization/fractionalization becomes significantly non-linear and contingent on 
the ruling political system. 
The rationale behind our result is quite straightforward. Conflict is costly. That is 
overall payoffs are less than what are achievable under peace. The costlier 
conflict is (if it actually takes place) the easier it becomes to assign payoffs to 
groups that Pareto dominate what they can obtain under conflict. Therefore, 
only the political systems with very unfair outcomes (such as dictatorship or 
majoritarian rule) will be always be challenged even when the cost of doing so 
is high. However, under “fairer” systems no group would be willing to pay too 
high a cost to obtain a different payoff. Therefore, it is only when conflict is 
nearly costless to one group (such as the case of one large group and a 
number of small opponents) that the outcome of the political system will be 
challenged, by that precisely that large group.17  
Highly polarized situations may well be fairly peaceful. This is what happened 
during the Cold War period, for instance. The cost of challenging the 
international status quo was so immense that even if one of the two sides 
considered the division of international power disproportionate it could not—or 
would not--trigger a world conflict. At the same time, when polarization is 
extremely low, there is little to fight about. Consequently, we would expect the 
overall degree of conflict to be maximal in societies with intermediate levels of 
polarization. 
What, then, are the hopes for the empirical exercises that try to identify a 
relationship between polarization/fractionalization and conflict? Two 
recommendations appear to emerge. First, there should be a serious attempt to 
account for the nonlinearity. For instance, in a parametric context, some 
progress may be possible by entering both polarization and its square on the 
                                                 
17 Note the similarity of this point with the findings of Collier (2001) on the dominant 
ethnicity provoking civil war. One should qualify these points, however, by observing 
that small groups can provoke conflict when private goods are at stake. For more on 
this issue, see Esteban and Ray (2006b). 
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right-hand-side of a regression.18 But the prescription is simply this: the 
empirical specification needs to be more firmly grounded in theory, even if that 
theory is extremely simple. 
Second, we have seen that the incidence of conflict depends not only on the 
shape of the distribution but also critically on the ruling political system. 
Alternative political systems perform quite differently in guaranteeing peace. For 
the countries with political systems that always yield conflict we shall observe 
that the intensity of conflict is (roughly) positively related to polarization (and 
negatively) to fractionalization. However, in countries with political systems that 
may yield peace, the occurrence and intensity of conflict will typically have a 
highly non-linear relationship with polarization and/or fractionalization. It follows 
that the exercise critically demands that political systems be controlled for.19  
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